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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of firms with family ownership
and their performance in Indonesia and further examine on how political connections affect this
relationship. This study used 933 samples from 413 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX) in the period between 2014 and 2016. Using ordinary least square (OLS) regression, the
results shows that firms without family ownership (non-family firms) have better performance than
firms with family ownership (family firms) in Indonesia. Furthermore, the findings also show that
the performance of family firms significantly improve when the firms are affiliated with political
connections. Our findings imply that establishing political connections in family firms will increase
the performance of the firms.
Keywords: family firms; political connections; firm performance; emerging countries
JEL Classification: G32; G34
1. Introduction
Over the past three decades, research on family firms attract attention from international scholars.
One of the most important questions is related to whether family firms have better performance
relative to non-family firms. The findings on the relationship between family firms and performance
also shows mixed evidence (McConaughy et al. 2001; Naldi et al. 2007; Sraer and Thesmar 2007;
Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Eddleston et al. 2007).
Another stream of literature that has also attracted considerable interest from scholars is about
political connections in business. Prior studies have found that firms with political connections have
several benefits (lower tax, government procurement, licenses, access to finance, lower cost of debt,
higher chance to be bailed out, less restriction on entry into regulated industry etc.) that could support
their connected firms (Boubakri et al. 2012; Houston et al. 2014; Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2012;
Harymawan 2018; Gray et al. 2016; Hung et al. 2017).
However, to our knowledge, only one article has discussed the impact of political connections on the
relationship between family firms and firm performance (Muttakin et al. 2015). Investigating the issue
of family firms and politics in Indonesia is interesting for several reasons. First, Claessens et al. (2000)
found that 68 percent of firms in Indonesia have family-ownership. Given the high percentage of
family firms, it is important to analyze the performance of family firms in Indonesia. One example
of a family firm in Indonesia is the Ciputra Group. This firm has been listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (IDX) since 1994. Up until now, this firm has diversified into 11 industries, including
township, office buildings, shopping centers, hotels, apartments, recreational centers, sport facilities,
telecommunications, healthcare, brokerage, media and commerce. Second, previous studies have
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shown that Indonesia is a country with high political influence in the context of business (Fisman 2001;
Harymawan and Nowland 2016). They found that connected firms in Indonesia affected by the changes
of political stability and government effectiveness. Specifically, connected firms provide different
financial reporting quality subject to the level of political stability and governmental effectiveness.
These findings shows that political connections in Indonesia play an important role on business
decision making. However, it remains unknown how political connections affect family firms decision
making in Indonesia.
This study extends the literature by examining the role of political connections on the relationship
between family firms and a firm’s performance in Indonesia. In the 2014, there was a presidential
election in Indonesia. At that time, Joko Widodo was appointed as the new President of Indonesia
(2014–2019). To avoid the bias of political connections proxy measure due to the possible political
power changes around the election, we decided to start our sample period in 2014. Using the firms
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2016, this study obtained a total of 933 firm-year
as the final sample. The descriptive statistics revealed that 41 percent and 34 percent of firms in
Indonesia are family-owned and politically connected, respectively. Twelve percent (111 out of the
933 observations) of the firms observed have both family-owned and political connections. Despite
this number being slightly lower than in the study by Claessens et al. (2000), the findings show that
family firms still comprise a major proportion of the Indonesian economy. We used some univariate
analyses to check the relationship between the variables. Our correlation matrix showed that family
firms have a negative and significant association with performance. However, there was no significant
association between political connections and a firm’s performance. When we compared the mean
between the group of family firms and the group of non-family firms, we found that family firms have
a significantly lower mean than the non-family firms. It also shows that family firms have a lower
probability of having political connections.
Next, we test the hypotheses using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Our first model showed
that family firms have significantly lower performance compared to non-family firms. We then tested
the effect of the involvement of politicians in family businesses on the relationship between family firms
and their performance. Interestingly, we found that family firms with political connections demonstrate
significantly better financial performance than other firms (family firms without political connections;
non-family firms with political connections; and non-family firms without political connections). These
findings indicate that political connections potentially provide support to family firms, which increases
their performance.
This study contributes to the literature by examining the role of political connections on the
performance of family firms in Indonesia. The remainder of this article consists of the literature review,
hypotheses development, data and methodology, results, and the conclusion.
2. Literature Review
Prior studies have discussed some features that affect the firm performance in Indonesia.
Harymawan et al. (2019) finds that more directorships held by the current chief executive officer (CEO)
will lead to lower performance of the firms. Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) also find a positive
associations between CEO duality and firm performance. Interestingly, they find that board size is a
negative moderating of the positive associations between CEO duality and firm performance.
SomepriorstudiesalsodiscussedaboutfamilyfirmsinIndonesiaMulyanietal. (2016); Untoro et al. (2017).
Some of previous studies also have examined the difference characteristics and outcomes between
family and non-family firms. Jara Bertin and Iturriaga (2014) found that higher control from the
dominant shareholders (i.e.: family members) resulted in lower earnings. Hategan et al. (2019) examine
the relationship between family firms and social responsibility awareness using a Romanian sample.
They found that Romanian family firms have greater attention on the current changes in business
environment and prepared an internal process strategy to response this changes. Specifically, they are
more aware on the sustainability of their business. Wang et al. (2016) also shows that family firms
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are more likely to conduct business transformation and to enter strongly correlative industries and
non-regulated industries than non-family firms.
There are two competing arguments on the relationship between family firms and firm performance.
Some scholars found that family firms have a better performance than non-family firms. For example,
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examined the relation between founding-family ownership and firm
performance. They found that family firms perform better than non-family firms, especially when
the family member serve as the CEO of the firms. Maury (2006) also investigated the performance of
family firms in Western Europe countries. He found that firms which actively controlled by family
members lead to better firm performance. He also found that family firms have higher firm valuation.
In contrast, some scholars have found a negative associations between family firms and firm
performance. Family firms are potentially facing some problems which could reduce their performance.
Benjamin et al. (2016) argued that when a family shareholder has a significant ownership level,
the firm has a higher probability to pay a high level of dividend. Furthermore, some firms are
also have higher probability to hire a family-related manager even if the individual has a lack of
managerial skills (Xu et al. 2015; Beuren et al. 2016). Internal family conflicts can lead to inharmonious
relationships within the company and this often ends in disunity (Cheng 2014). In addition, the
successor (second/next-generation) tends to destroy the original value (Villalonga and Amit 2006).
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) find that firms with family involvement in management have lower
performance. Based on above discussion, we predict there is an associations between family firms and
firm performance in Indonesia. The formal hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1. There is an associations between firms with family ownership (family firms) and firm performance.
Prior studies have discussed the effect of political connections on business in Indonesia.
Fisman (2001) investigate the relationship of politically connected firms in Indonesia and stock
price market reactions. He uses a health condition of former president of Indonesia, Suharto, as
an event to test this relationship. He found that the stock price of politically connected firms in
Indonesia dropped significantly when there was a bad news on the health of Suharto. In contrast,
when there was good news on Suharto’s health condition, the stock price increased significantly.
Harymawan and Nowland (2016) showed that the earnings quality of politically connected firms in
Indonesia is dependent on the level of political stability and government effectiveness.
Prior literature suggests that political connections can provide prefential benefits to their connected
firms Boubakri et al. (2012); Houston et al. (2014); Adhikari et al. (2006); Wu et al. (2012); Harymawan (2018).
Boubakri et al. (2012) showed that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity than non-politically
connected firms. Houston et al., also found that firms which hire a director with political ties have a
significant lower cost of bank loans. Furthermore, Adhikari et al. (2006) found that firms with political
connections in Malaysia pay a significant lower rate of tax. In China, Wu et al. (2012) showed that private
firms with politically connected directors pay also pay a lower tax rate. Harymawan (2018) also showed that
militarily connected firms (one type of political connections) enjoy a lower loan interest rate in Indonesia.
Based on some benefits earned by politically connected firms, it is expected that political
connections could help the connected firms to increase their performance. Niessen and Ruenzi (2010)
found that in Germany connected firms have significantly better stock market performance than
their non-connected peers. Li et al. (2008) investigated the performance of the firms which owned
by private entrepreneurs which join as a political party member in China. They found that these
firms perform better than firms owned by private entrepreneurs which do not join a political party.
Ding et al. (2014) also find that the state-owned enterprises improves their accounting performance
despite they have weakens board independence. Based on the above discussion, we expect that
political connections could help family firms to increase their firm performance. Therefore, we propose
the formal hypothesis as follow.
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Hypothesis 2. Family firms with political connections will have better firm performance than other firms.
3. Methodology
3.1. Samples and Data Sources
The initial observations of this study was 1239 firms (413 firms per year) consist of all industries
covered on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) spanning from 2014 to 2016. Based on our first sample
selection criteria, we exclude all firms in the financial industry due to the nature of their financial
statements. Excluding firms from financial industry from the sample increase the comparability
between firms (Sánchez and Yurdagul 2013). Secondly, we also exclude all firms without complete
financial data.
The data was obtained from two sources. The first set of data, financial data, was collected from
the ORBIS database. The second set of data, non-financial data, was obtained from the annual report,
financial reports, and company performance summaries which are available from IDX (Indonesia Stock
Exchange) website and or ICMD (Indonesia Capital Market Directory) data. We hand-collected several
items of data such as political connections (PCON), family firms (FF), the number of commissioners
(COMSIZE) and directors (DIRSIZE), the percentage of independent commissioners (INDCOM), and
the percentage of independent directors (INDDIR) from the reports. Finally, we merged these data
with the data from ORBIS. As a result, we found 933 firms-year observations as our final sample.
3.2. Variables Definition
3.2.1. Family Firms
The family firms were measured by the position of director or commissioner being held by more
than one member of the same family (marked by the same surname) and by having ownership of
at least 5% of the shares (Zhou et al. 2017). Referring to regulation from Indonesia Financial Service
Authority,1 it is compulsory for the public firms in Indonesia to disclose the affiliated relationships
among director and commissioner within the firms in their annual report. Furthermore, we also did a
re-check of each affiliated relationships found in the annual report to confirm the relationship.
3.2.2. Political Connections
Political connections (PCON) were measured through the commissioners and directors of
companies who were currently or formerly members of parliament (DPR), ministers, heads of
state, or those who had close ties with top politicians and/or parties (Faccio 2006). They also had to
meet the criteria of PEP (politically exposed person) according to Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
12/3/PBI/2010’s explanation of article 11. Based on this regulation, a politically exposed person is
defined as “individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in either
domestically or internationally, for example State Officials as referred to in laws and regulations
that governs State Officials, and/or senor politicians that have influence on the party’s policies and
operations”. The data on the political connections were obtained through the profiles of the directors
and commissioners of the firms contained in their annual report.
3.2.3. Firm Performance
The firm’s performance was the dependent variable of this study, measured using Tobin’s Q
approach which refers to the research conducted by Muttakin et al. (2015). Tobin’s Q represents the
view of long-term investors because one of its formulae uses the market value of equity. The market
1 Surat Edaran Otoritas Jasa Keuangan Number 30 04 2016.
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value of equity is the accumulation that starts from the firm’s long efforts. It is different when compared
to ROA, which uses profit as a basis, because ROA also only represents a short period of time (one year).
4. Result
The definition of all variables used in this study are available in the Appendix A. All analyses in
this study were conducted using STATA software. Figure 1 presents the relation between independent
and dependent variables in this study.
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Figure 1. Research framework.
Table 1 provide the details of sample distribution in this study. Panel A presents the comparison
of the sample between firms with and without family ownership. It shows that 41 percent of firms in
this sample have family ownership in the firm. Manufacturing industry has the highest fraction of
family firm in this sample. Panel B presents the comparison between firms with and without political
connections. About 39 percent of the firms are politically connected. Wholesale and retail trade is the
industry with the highest percentage of firms with political connections. Panel C shows the number of
politically connected firms with family ownership. It shows that 111 firms (12 percents) are belongs to
this category.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. Firm performance
was measured by TOBINS_Q, which represents the long-term view of the investor. INDCOM or the
percentage of independent commissioners had a maximum value of 100% because there are several
companies whose entire body of commissioners are also independent commissioners.
Figure 2 present the details of the generation of active family firms who serve as directors. Based on
the data in Indonesia in the period 2014–2016, it shows that most of the family firms is actively operated
by the second generation of the family. Unfortunately, there are many firms that do not disclose this
information in detail. Figure 3 shows the dist ibution of the political connection positions in family
firms. Most of the politicians serve as commissionaire in the firm. The independent commissioner
position is the highest position, which is more likely to be held by someone with a political connections.
Table 3 presents the comparison of the firm characteristics between firm with and without family
ownership. The coefficient of TOBINS_Q is −3.397 and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests
that firms with political connections significantly perform better than non-family firms. The results
also shows that family firms in Indonesia are less likely to be politically connected, have smaller size of
board commissionaire, smaller firms size, have a lower capital intensity, and lower leverage.
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Table 1. Sample distribution.
Panel A Family Firms Sample Distribution (FF)
SECTOR (SIC) INDUSTRY
FF NON-FF TOTAL
n % n % n %
0 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 16 43% 21 57% 37 100%
1 Mining 76 50% 76 50% 152 100%
2 Construction Industries 104 46% 121 54% 225 100%
3 Manufacturing 50 33% 102 67% 152 100%
4 Transportation, Communication and Utilities 58 36% 102 64% 160 100%
5 Wholesale and Retail Trade 36 36% 65 64% 101 100%
7 Services Industries 36 45% 44 55% 80 100%
8 Health, Legal and Educational Services and Consulting 11 42% 15 58% 26 100%
TOTAL 387 41% 546 59% 933 100%
Panel B Politically Connected Firms Sample Distribution (PCON)
SECTOR (SIC) INDUSTRY
PCON NON-PCON TOTAL
n % n % n %
0 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 6 16% 31 84% 37 100%
1 Mining 48 32% 104 68% 152 100%
2 Construction Industries 80 36% 145 64% 225 100%
3 Manufacturing 55 36% 97 64% 152 100%
4 Transportation, Communication and Utilities 37 23% 123 77% 160 100%
5 Wholesale and Retail Trade 42 42% 59 58% 101 100%
7 Services Industries 32 40% 48 60% 80 100%
8 Health, Legal and Educational Services and Consulting 18 69% 8 31% 26 100%
TOTAL 318 34% 615 66% 933 100%
Panel C Politically Connected Family Firms Sample Distribution (FF × PCON)
SECTOR (SIC) INDUSTRY
FF x PCON NON-FF × PCON TOTAL
n % n % n %
0 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 6 16% 31 84% 37 100%
1 Mining 19 13% 133 88% 152 100%
2 Construction Industries 19 8% 206 92% 225 100%
3 Manufacturing 21 14% 131 86% 152 100%
4 Transportation, Communication and Utilities 7 4% 153 96% 160 100%
5 Wholesale and Retail Trade 21 21% 80 79% 101 100%
7 Services Industries 7 9% 73 91% 80 100%
8 Health, Legal and Educational Services and Consulting 11 42% 15 58% 26 100%
TOTAL 111 12% 822 88% 933 100%
Notes: Panel A presents the sample of family firms (FF) and non-family firms; Panel B presents politically connected
firms (PCON) and non-politically connected firms; Panel C presents politically connected family firms (FF × PCON)
and non-politically connected family firms. All the sample is exhibited in the Panel A, B and C show 933 companies
from all industrial sectors except industry with SIC 6 which is listed the in IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange)
in 2014–2016.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics (n = 933).
VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM
TOBINS_Q 1.151 0.570 0.040 11.830
FF 0.328 0.000 0.000 1.000
PCON 0.341 0.000 0.000 1.000
COMSIZE 4.250 4.000 1.000 22.000
INDCOM 37.811 33.333 0.000 100.000
DIRSIZE 4.706 4.000 2.000 16.000
INDDIR 15.362 16.667 0.000 66.667
FIRMAGE 32.224 31.000 4.000 115.000
T ASSET 8.088.000.000.000 2.268.000.000.000 24.648.960 86.080.000.000.000
MTB 0.232 0.111 −0.234 2.863
CAPINT 0.565 0.588 0.045 0.979
GROWTH 0.092 0.052 −0.645 1.523
LEV 0.555 0.501 0.031 4.431
This table presents descriptive statistics result of variables research used in this study. This research uses
933 companies from all industries excluding the financial industry (SIC 6) which are listed in IDX (Indonesia Stock
Exchange) for the period 2014–2016.
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Table 3. Firm characteristics (n = 933).
VARIABLES
Family Firms Non-Family Firms Mean Median
N = 387 N = 546 t-value z-value
TOBINS_Q 0.912 1.321 −3.397 *** −2.932 ***
PCON 0.287 0.379 −2.941 *** −2.929 ***
COMSIZE 4.137 4.330 −1.487 −2.295 **
INDCOM 37.556 37.992 −0.481 −0.722
DIRSIZE 4.791 4.647 1.109 1.377
INDDIR 14.739 15.803 −1.103 −1.474
FIRMAGE 2.528 2.493 0.681 0.774
FIRMSIZE 458.393 475.170 −3.487 *** −3.731 ***
MTB 0.185 0.264 −2.845 *** −2.122 **
CAPINT 0.541 0.582 −2.646 *** −2.887 ***
GROWTH 0.097 0.089 0.452 0.790
LEV 0.522 0.578 −1.821 * −0.533
This table presents firm characteristics result of variables research used in this study. This research used 933
companies from all industries except the financial industry (SIC 6) which are listed in the IDX (Indonesia Stock
Exchange) in 2014–2016. * z < 1.640, ** z < 1.960, *** z < 2.570, significant in 10%, 5% and 1%.
In the first hypothesis, we predict that firms with family ownerships are more likely to have
a lower performance than firms without family ownership. To test this hypotesis, we use an OLS
regression by constructing Equation (1). In this model, we include a set of control variables following
the previous studies Harymawan and Nowland (2016); Harymawan et al. (2017). We also control for
year and industry fixed effects. The detail of Equation (1) is presented as follows:
TOBINS_Q = α + β1FF+ β2PCON + β3COMSIZE + β4INDCOM + β5DIRSIZE+
β6INDDIR + β7FIRMAGE + β8FIRMSIZE + β9MTB + β10CAPINT + β11GROWTH+
β12LEV + YEAR & INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS + ε
(1)
Table 5 presents the results of OLS regression to test the hypothesis 1. In the specification 1 we
use family firms (FF) proxy constructed by Zhou et al. (2017). The coefficient of FF shows −0.147 and
is significant in the 5 percent level (t = −2.52). This findings imply that firms with family ownership
have a lower firm performance relative to firms without family ownership. As a robustnest test,
we conduct the an additional OLS regression test as shown in specification 2. In this specification,
we use an alternative measure of family firms based on Cheng (2014). Using this alternative proxy
of family firms, the result is hold. The coefficient of FF is −0.100 and significant in the 10 percent
level (t = −1.80). However, the regression results show that there is no significant association between
political connections and firm performance.
In the second hypothesis, we examine whether and how the political connections affect the negative
associations between family firms and company performance. To test the hypothesis, we formulate
equation regression 2 as follows:
TOBINS_Q = α + β1FFxPCON + β2FF + β3PCON + β4COMSIZE + β5INDCOM+
β6DIRSIZE + β7INDDIR + β8FIRMAGE + β9FIRMSIZE + β10MTB + β11CAPINT+
β12GROWTH + β13LEV + YEAR & INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECS + ε
(2)
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Table 4. Pearson correlations (n = 933).
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
[1] TOBINS_Q 1.000
[2] FF −0.111 *** 1.000
(0.001)
[3] PCON 0.052 −0.096 *** 1.000
(0.116) (0.003)
[4] COMSIZE 0.090 *** −0.049 0.286 *** 1.000
(0.006) (0.137) (0.000)
[5] INDCOM −0.051 −0.016 0.084 ** 0.031 1.000
(0.121) (0.631) (0.010) (0.339)
[6] DIRSIZE 0.029 0.036 0.240 *** 0.467 *** 0.020 1.000
(0.385) (0.268) (0.000) (0.000) (0.540)
[7] INDDIR 0.049 −0.036 −0.041 −0.123 *** 0.170 *** −0.259 *** 1.000
(0.131) (0.271) (0.215) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[8] FIRMAGE 0.043 0.022 0.012 0.069 ** −0.049 0.032 −0.144 *** 1.000
(0.187) (0.496) (0.712) (0.034) (0.134) (0.332) (0.000)
[9] FIRMSIZE −0.054 * −0.114 *** 0.287 *** 0.520 *** 0.055 * 0.547 *** −0.142 *** −0.062 * 1.000
(0.098) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.056)
[10] MTB 0.815 *** −0.093 *** 0.076 ** 0.099 *** −0.084 ** 0.044 0.018 0.008 0.021 1.000
(0.000) (0.005) (0.020) (0.003) (0.010) (0.182) (0.573) (0.808) (0.513)
[11] CAPINT −0.017 −0.086 *** 0.010 0.060 * 0.078 ** 0.023 0.028 −0.174 *** 0.212 *** 0.023 1.000
(0.594) (0.008) (0.764) (0.068) (0.018) (0.484) (0.389) (0.000) (0.000) (0.488)
[12] GROWTH −0.014 0.015 0.025 0.066 ** −0.048 0.027 −0.069 ** −0.104 *** 0.101 *** 0.045 −0.008 1.000
(0.679) (0.651) (0.452) (0.044) (0.141) (0.406) (0.035) (0.001) (0.002) (0.169) (0.802)
[13] LEV 0.011 −0.060 * 0.032 −0.102 *** 0.108 *** −0.089 *** −0.072 ** 0.054 * −0.088 *** −0.048 0.128 *** −0.074 ** 1.000
(0.747) (0.069) (0.333) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.027) (0.100) (0.007) (0.143) (0.000) (0.023)
This table presents Pearson correlation result of variables research used in this study. This research used 933 companies from all industries except the financial industry (SIC 6) which are
listed in the IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) in 2014–2016. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, significant in 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 5. Regression results of family firms and politically connected firms on firm performance.
VARIABLES
TOBINS_Q
(1) (2)
FF −0.147 ** −0.100 *
(−2.52) (−1.80)
PCON −0.049 −0.052
(−0.64) (−0.68)
COMSIZE 0.060 *** 0.061 ***
(3.17) (3.18)
INDCOM 0.001 0.001
(0.28) (0.30)
DIRSIZE 0.041 ** 0.040 *
(1.96) (1.91)
INDDIR 0.005 * 0.005 *
(1.77) (1.72)
FIRMAGE 0.051 0.051
(1.11) (1.11)
FIRMSIZE −0.003 *** −0.003 ***
(−3.19) (−3.09)
MTB 3.497 *** 3.508 ***
(17.72) (17.76)
CAPINT −0.171 −0.172
(−1.03) (−1.02)
GROWTH −0.195 −0.199
(−1.18) (−1.21)
LEV 0.192 0.195
(0.85) (0.85)
CONSTANT 0.836 ** 0.750 **
(2.54) (2.34)
Year Dummies Included Included
Industry Dummies Included Included
R-Squared 0.686 0.685
Number of Observation 933 933
This table presents regression result of family firms and politically connected firms on firm performance. This research
use 933 companies from all industries except the financial industry (SIC 6) which are listed in the IDX (Indonesia
Stock Exchange) from 2014 to 2016. *, **, and *** is significant in 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Table 6 presents the results on the relationship between family firms and political connections on
firm performance. In specification 1, we find that the coefficient of FFxPCON is 0.255 and significant in
the 10 percent level (t = 1.79). This finding shows that a firm with family ownership which afiliated
to political connections has better performance relative to others. We also find that the coefficient
of FF is −0.232 and significant in the 1 percent level (t = −3.01). This result shows that family firms
without political connections has lower performance than other firms. In addition, the result shows
that PCON (non-family firms with political connections) is not significantly related to performance.
Furthermore, we also conducted an additional test using an alternative proxy of family firms using the
definition from Cheng (2014). As shown in specification 2, we find consistent results that firms with
family ownership which have politically connected directors will have higher performance relative to
other firms. Overal, the results indicate that in Indonesia, establishing political connections for family
firm could improve the performance of family firms which support our hypothesis. For companies,
the findings of this study suggest that family firms in Indonesia might consider political connections as
one of potential resources to improve the performance of the firms.
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Table 6. Regression result of the interaction of family firms and politically connected firms on
firm performance.
VARIABLES
TOBINS_Q
(1) (2)
FFxPCON 0.255 * 0.359 **
(1.79) (2.55)
FF −0.232 *** −0.207 ***
(−3.01) (−2.92)
PCON −0.147 −0.152
(−1.31) (−1.53)
COMSIZE 0.059 *** 0.059 ***
(3.16) (3.14)
INDCOM 0.001 0.001
(0.32) (0.29)
DIRSIZE 0.041 ** 0.041 *
(1.97) (1.95)
INDDIR 0.005 * 0.005
(1.70) (1.64)
FIRMAGE 0.052 0.055
(1.13) (1.20)
FIRMSIZE −0.003 *** −0.003 ***
(−3.13) (−3.06)
MTB 3.500 *** 3.506 ***
(17.77) (17.72)
CAPINT −0.199 −0.204
(−1.17) (−1.21)
GROWTH −0.197 −0.202
(−1.19) (−1.23)
LEV 0.190 0.196
(0.84) (0.86)
CONSTANT 0.831 ** 0.745 **
(2.53) (2.33)
Year Dummies Included Included
Industry Dummies Included Included
R-Squared 0.687 0.687
Number of Observation 933 933
This table presents regression results of the interaction of family firms and politically connected firms on firm
performance. This research used 933 companies from all industries excluding the financial industry (SIC 6) which
are listed in IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) from 2014 to 2016. *, **, and *** is significant in 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
This study sheds light on the role of political connections on the relationship between familiy firms
and firm performance in Indonesia. Our findings confirm the negative relationship between family
firms and firm performance. As a country which has significant political influence in business decision
making, we further demonstrate that establishing political connections for family firms in Indonesia
will enhance the performance of the firms. These findings strenghten prior findings which documents
the positive associations between political connections and firm performance. The results of this
study should be treated with caution since this study defines political connections using the politically
exposed person (PEP) definition based on Indonesian banking regulation. This may underestimate the
value political connections in Indonesia. For the future avenue of this research, it will be interesting to
examine whether these relationships hold or change as the political power map changes.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Variable definitions.
Variables Definition Measurement Data Sources
Dependent Variable—Firm Performance
TOBINS_Q Tobin’s Q Market value of equity and book value of liabilities divided bytotal asset. (Muttakin et al. 2015) ORBIS
Independent Variables
FF (Zhou) Family Firm
Dummy variable, 1 for family firm and 0 otherwise. In this
research, family firm is defined from position in director or
commissioner held by more than 1 member of family in same firm
(same family member marked from the same surname) and from
direct ownership of company share minimum 5%.
(Zhou et al. 2017)
IDX ICMD from in
2014–2016
FF (Cheng) Family Firm
Dummy variable, 1 for family firm and 0 otherwise. In this
research, family firm is defined from position in director or
commissioner held by more than 1 member of family in same firm
(same family member marked from the same surname).
(Cheng 2014)
IDX ICMD from in
2014–2016
PCON Politicallyconnected firm
Dummy variable, 1 for politically connected firm and 0 otherwise.
Politically connected firm is defined from political experiences by
commissioner or director which meet PEP (politically exposed
person) criteria.
IDX Financial
Report and Annual
Report in
2014–2016
Control Variables
COMSIZE Commissioner size Total commissioner in company include independent ornon-affiliated commissioner in a year.
IDX Financial
Report in
2014–2016
INDCOM Independentcommissioner
Percentage of Independent commissioner compared with total
commissioner in a year.
IDX Financial
Report in
2014–2016
DIRSIZE Director size Total director in company, include independent or non-affiliateddirector in a year.
IDX Financial
Report in
2014–2016
INDDIR Independentdirector
Percentage of Independent director compared with total director
in a year.
IDX Financial
Report in
2014–2016
FIRMAGE Firm age Natural logarithm of firm age that counted from incorporate date(Muttakin et al. 2015) ORBIS
FIRMSIZE Firm size
Quadrate from natural logarithm of total assets.
(ln(TOTAL ASSET))2
(Muttakin et al. 2015)
ORBIS
MTB Market to bookratio
Ratio of Market value of equity compared to book value of equity.
(Xu et al. 2015) ORBIS
CAPINT Capital intensity Ratio of fixed assets compared to total assets (Wu et al. 2012) ORBIS
GROWTH Firm growth
Ratio of asset growth in a year.
TOTAL ASSET t − TOTAL ASSET (t− 1)
TOTAL ASSET (t− 1)
(Muttakin et al. 2015)
ORBIS
LEV Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Xu et al. 2015) ORBIS
SIC SIC Code
Standard Industrial Classification Code are four-digit numerical
codes assigned by the U.S. government to business establishments
to identify the primary business of the establishment.
ORBIS
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